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Abstract 
The research within presents the use of Hidden Markov Models (HMM) for the detection of wireless devices in 
highly noisy environments using their unintended electromagnetic emissions (UEE). All electromagnetic devices emit 
such radiation that is unique to the electronics, housing, and other device attributes. This pattern recognition system 
can provide continuous detection analysis and can provide ideal information regarding the distance to an unknown 
device. An experiment was performed where UEE of a device was detected by a spectrum analyzer. Experimental 
result shows that our model can accurately detect if there is a device nearby emitting UEE or not. 
 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection  
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1. Introduction 
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are extensively used by terrorist to attack their enemies. Radio 
frequency (RF) receivers are primarily used as detonators of these IEDs. There are two ways RF receivers 
can be used as triggers. One way is to wire the explosive material to the RF receiver directly. A call is 
then made to that phone which results in the generation of a small charge. This causes the trigger to the 
wired IED which results in explosion. This method is called „call in‟ technique. Another technique is to 
set a timer using the internal alarm of the RF receiver. The IED will detonate when the alarm is triggered 
[1].  
A large number of coalition fatalities in Afghanistan and Iraq are due to the IEDs. Table 1 illustrates 
the number of coalition fatalities in Afghanistan and the number and percentage of fatalities attributed to 
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IEDs. If we consider the total coalition fatalities of 2,683 in and around Afghanistan, IEDs are responsible 
for 42% of deaths [2]. Refer to table 1 for data.  If we just consider 2,156 hostile fatalities of the coalition 
force, then IEDs are responsible for a staggering 52% of all fatalities. If we can somehow detect IEDs that 
are present nearby, the number of coalition death can be significantly reduced not only in and around 
Afghanistan, but in other hostile environment where this form of terrorism exists. This shows that 
detection and localization of RF receivers in a hostile territory could be an effective approach to reduce 
the number of fatalities.  
 
   
Year 
 Coalition 
Fatalities in 
Afghanistan 
Fatalities 
Attributed 
to IED 
Percentage 
Attributed 
to IED 
2001 12 0 0% 
2002 70 4 6% 
2003 58 3 5% 
2004 60 12 20% 
2005 131 20 15% 
2006 191 41 21% 
2007 232 78 34% 
2008 295 152 52% 
2009 521 275 53% 
2010 711 368 52% 
2011 402 177 44% 
Total 2683 1130 42% 
Table 1:  Coalition Fatalities in Afghanistan 
All RF receivers produce unintended electromagnetic emissions (UEE) [3]. RF receivers are based on 
superheterodyne receiver architecture of Edwin Armstrong. This architecture uses local oscillator (LO) as 
a necessary component of the receiver. Some of the electromagnetic emission inevitably leaks from the 
LO and is emitted from the antennae of the RF receivers as UEE. This process is explained in [4]. The 
emissions also depend on specific electronics and the housing of the device. If we identify UEEs of 
possible explosives in hostile area, IEDs can be safely deactivated prior to causing harm.  
Unfortunately, UEEs are very weak in power and is thus difficult to detect, at least from a significant 
distance. The challenge is to identify such signal in the presence of noise. Some progress has been done in 
this area. Neural Network has successfully been employed to identify and locate electronic devices up to a 
distance of 10m [5]. Dong et al. (2006) have successfully identified three vehicles based on their RF 
emissions using neural networks [6]. But as noted by them, the problem with these approaches is that all 
these methods are sensitive to noise. A noble approach of using statistical correlation to identify 
unintended emissions from a toy truck is given in [7]. A biconical antenna was used and the 
measurements were taken by oscilloscope for time domain and spectrum analyzer for frequency domain. 
Ideal unintended electromagnetic emission pulse was constructed from the observations using the 
cascading correlation procedure. The cascaded signal is finally normalized by the maximum value to get 
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an ideal pulse. The detection is done by correlating the test signal with ideal pulse. A threshold correlation 
value is identified above which the signals are assumed from the particular device. This method can 
identify devices up to a distance of 40m with an accuracy of 98% under Receiver Operating 
Characteristics (ROC) curve. The drawback of this method is that, UEE changes with respect to battery 
charge, climate, and ambient noise. A little change in any of these parameters, which is very much likely 
in the real world, significantly reduces this methods‟ ability to correctly detect the IED.  
We present a more robust approach to generate an underlying pattern recognition statistical model 
using HMM. This model once trained from emission data will outline a comparison between the trained 
model and the observations, which results in the highest likelihood estimation that a given observation 
came from a particular model. The reason for choosing HMM is that it is a robust model based upon well 
defined mathematical theories and which has proven results from a variety of applications that it performs 
well [8],[9]. 
2. Data Collection 
Data collection for this project has been done using U3700 spectrum analyzer by Advantest and 
VERT400 tri-band antenna. XR150U Business Two-Way Radio is the RF receiver selected for this 
project. The operating frequency of the device is 450 – 470 MHz‟s. UEEs have very low power 
emissions. For the purpose of clarity, a span has been fixed to 20 kHz and the distance from which 
readings have been taken is 5 ft. Experimental setup for the data correction part is shown in figure 1. As 
we can see the RF receiver is kept at the fixed distance from spectrum analyzer. In order to collect data, 
the spectrum analyzer has been set to -30db level to appropriately display the signal on screen. On every 
instance of unintended emissions, one sample of 1,001 points are stored on excel sheet. 60 samples of 
data were collected altogether, 30 for device and 30 for noise.  
 
 
Figure 1: Experimental Setup for Data Collection 
 
3. Data Preparation  
The signal recorded by the spectrum analyzer constitutes the plot of amplitude against frequency.  The 
reading was taken such that the central frequency always lies in the center of the span. The span of the 
signal is of 20 KHz. Each successive observation has amplitude measured at the difference of 20Hz. A 
typical signal is shown in figure 2a. Since the span is chosen such that the effect of UEE is visible around 
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the center frequency, the observation near the center frequency is of importance to us. We considered 401 
observations near the center and crop the rest of 600 observations. We limit ourselves with the 
observation between 300 and 700. The resulting figure is shown in figure 2b. 
 
       
Figure 2a: Electromagnetic Emission with 1001 Observations               Figure 2b: Electromagnetic Emission with 401 Observations 
4. Methodology 
Hidden markov model is represented by the tuple   = (M,N,A,B,  ) where each element is defined as 
following: 
 
i. M is the number of states and individual state is represented as S = {S1, S2,…,Sm} 
ii. N is the number of observations and individual observation is represented as O = {O1, 
O2,…,On} 
iii. A = {aij} is the state transition matrix where aij = P[qt+1 = Sj, /     qt = Si], 1  i, j  M 
iv. B = {bj(k)} is the emission transition matrix where bj(k) = P[Ok at t / qt = Sj], 1 i M and 
1 k N 
v.   = {  i} is the initial state probability distribution where  i = P[q1 = Si], 1 i M 
 
To represent any system as HMM described above, we need to have a Markov Chain and for this, we 
should define some states such that there is some probability associated with transfer from one state to 
another as stated in iii above. The change in amplitude of successive observation is taken as a state. The 
observations are observed at a span of 20 Hz. We have classified the difference in successive observations 
into five classes and these are taken as the 5 states that define HMM. The state definition is illustrated in 
table 2a. Since HMM is a doubly embedded stochastic process, we need to define another stochastic 
process apart from the markov chain. The set of visible observation sequence completes the components 
required to define the HMM along with the markov chain. We have defined the amplitude of the signal 
corresponding to the change in observation defined in state as the observation for our HMM. We have 
classified the amplitude into six classes and these are taken as the 6 observations for our HMM. The  
probability of observing one of the six observations defined in table 2b from a state gives the Emission 
Probability Matrix (EPM). A typical HMM is represented in figure 3. Using the principle of counting, we 
calculate the probability of observing a particular observation coming from a given state. Wolfram 
Mathematica 7 was used to calculate the Transition Probability Matrix (TPM) and EPM as defined in iii 
and iv respectively. 
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Figure 3: HMM Representation 
5. Experimental Results 
We have two hidden markov models, one defined for the device and another defined for  noise. A total 
of 20 data samples, 10 from device and 10 from noise were fed as inputs to both models. The probability 
that the model generated the sample data was calculated using Matlab 7.10. The corresponding device or 
noise of the model that generated higher probability was selected as the one generating the signal. For 
example if P (O1/  ) > P (O1/  ) where O1 is an observation signal,    is HMM for the device and     is 
HMM for the noise, then we infer that O1 is emitted by   . Our model was accurately able to identify the 
source of all the input signals: all the 10 UEE signals emitted from the device were identified as device 
signals and the rest of noise signals were accurately identified as noise. This is illustrated in table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State Name  Power change 
range (in dB)  
State 1  > 4dB  
State 2  (0, 4] dB  
State 3 0 dB  
State 4  [-4,0) dB  
State 5  < -4dB  
Observation  Amplitude level 
range (in dB) 
Observation 1  < -120dB  
Observation 2 [-120, -115)dB  
Observation 3 [-115, -110)dB  
Observation 4 [-110, -105)dB  
Observation 5 [-105, -100)dB  
Observation 6 >= -100 dB  Table 2a: State Definition 
Table 2b: Observation Definition 
Table 3: Experimental Results 
 Noise 
Signal 
Device 
Signal 
Number of times 
identified as device  
 
0  10  
Number of times 
identified as noise  
10  0  
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6. Conclusions and Future Works 
We have successfully employed HMMs to detect UEE. As per our knowledge, this is the first time 
HMMs have been applied in identifying malicious devices through their unintended emissions. We have 
proved that at a shorter distance, we can infer whether there is a malicious device or not even in a noisy 
environment without using an amplifier. This research has provided a foundation for future work. The 
first exploration to be done is to verify if this method works on longer distances than is considered here. 
Another exploration would be to determine if this method can recognize between two or more RF 
receivers instead of just differentiating between a single device and noise. Finally, another future direction 
would be to build a model with various features other than taking the difference in amplitude of 
successive observations. 
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